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ABSTRACT
An overview of significant Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) impacts on the Payload Bay Door
radiators, wing leading edge reinforced carbon-carbon panels and crew module windows will be presented, along
with a discussion of the techniques NASA has implemented to reduce the risk from MMOD impacts. The concept
of “Late Inspection” of the Nose Cap and Wing leading Edge (WLE) Reinforced Carbon Carbon (RCC) regions
will be introduced. An alternative mated attitude with the International Space Station (ISS) on shuttle MMOD risk
will also be presented. The significant threat mitigation effect of these two techniques will be demonstrated. The
wing leading edge impact detection system, on-orbit repair techniques and disabled vehicle contingency plans will
also be discussed.
INTRODUCTION
NASA’s Space Shuttle program has completed 123
shuttle flights between 1981 and 2008. Orbiter
vehicles have spent nearly 1,167 days in low Earth
orbit in altitudes ranging from 220 to 600 kilometers
and inclinations between 28.5 and 62 degrees. This
paper will document protection upgrades, operational
changes, inspection and repair techniques that have
served to mitigate risk from MMOD impacts, with
emphasis placed on changes taking place since
Return to Flight in 2005.
samples of ISS shields and subsystems, Shuttle
thermal protection system (TPS) materials,
Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) materials and
other spacecraft components to determine MMOD
impact parameters at the failure limits of the various
subsystems. BUMPER is used to calculate MMOD
impact risks to specific Orbiter surfaces. An
integrated mission assessment is completed using
Poisson statistics and knowledge of the distribution
of times spent in each unique Orbiter attitude [1].
MITIGATION HISTORY
BUMPER-II
BUMPER-II is an MMOD risk analysis program
originally developed for the Space Station Freedom
Program. Over the years, the capabilities of this
engineering analysis tool have been extended to
include the Space Shuttle Orbiter, ISS and many
other spacecraft. When provided with a vehicle
shape, orbit parameters and applicable ballistic limit
equations with defined failure criteria, the BUMPER-
II code will calculate the MMOD risk for spacecraft
in low Earth orbit against a variety of natural and
man-made environments. Thousands of hypervelocity
impact tests have been performed on representative
Previous shuttle modifications to increase MMOD
protection have been discussed by Loftus, et al. [2].
They include improvements to the wing leading edge
thermal protection system with Nextel insulation
blankets that increase thermal margins of the panel’s
structural attachment to the wing spar. Another
improvement discussed by Loftus involved the
installation of aluminum doublers over the coolant
tubes in the payload bay door radiators and the
addition of isolation valves to prevent excessive loss
of coolant in the event of tube leak. These protection
upgrades were installed throughout the fleet in the
mid 1990’s [3]. Operational protocols for collision
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avoidance maneuvers that were implemented by the
Space Shuttle Program in the 1980’s are an example
of an operational change that mitigated impact risk
[4]. Large orbital debris fragments are tracked by the
US Space Command’s Space Surveillance Network,
which communicates possible future conjunctions to
the Flight Dynamics Officer in Mission Control
Center. Another example of an operational change
that reduced MMOD risk was the introduction of a
flight rule concerning orbiter attitude. The rule
provides guidance on flight attitudes that minimize
MMOD risk [4]. In general, the flight rule puts the
orbiter in an attitude where the tail is forward and the
payload bay faces earth. At the time the flight rule
was published, this was considered the minimum risk
attitude for critical MMOD damage.
SIGNIFICANT MMOD IMPACTS
One of the earliest documented impacts on the shuttle
occurred during the STS-7 mission in 1983 when an
orbital debris particle of spacecraft paint produced a
4mm pit in a crew module window [3]. The crew
photographed the impact site on orbit.
The STS-50 mission in 1992 spent nearly 10 days in
a nose space, payload bay forward attitude during a
16 day Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO) mission.
Postflight inspections revealed a 0.57 mm deep crater
with a diameter of 7.2 mm x 6.8 mm in window #4
(right hand forward). The damage caused the window
to be removed and replaced. The STS-50 mission
experienced a large increase in payload bay door
radiators impacts when compared to previous
missions [6]. The largest radiator impact on STS-50
occurred on left hand forward panel #1. The impact
produced a 3.8 mm diameter hole in the thermal
control tape and a 1.1 mm diameter hole in the face
sheet.
The 16 day STS-73 mission in 1995 carried a United
States Microgravity Module (USML) Spacelab
module and an EDO cryogenics pallet in the payload
bay. The vehicle was oriented with its port wing into
the velocity vector for 13 days of the mission, so the
port payload door was kept partially closed in order
to protect the USML and EDO payloads from
MMOD impacts. Post flight inspections revealed a
crater in the outside surface of the port payload bay
door that was 17 mm in diameter and 6 mm deep. A
1.2 mm long intact fragment of a circuit board was
found in the crater [6]. If this orbital debris projectile
had impacted a different region of the orbiter, such as
the EDO pallet or a wing leading edge RCC panel, it
could have caused the loss of the vehicle and crew.
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Figure 1. Payload bay of shuttle Columbia on STS-73
After the STS-86 mission in 1997, several significant
MMOD impacts were observed on the left hand
radiator interconnect lines (Fig. 2). The aluminum
tubes carry Freon coolant between the thermal
control system radiator panels.
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Figure 2. Impacts on STS-86 LH radiator interconnect
lines.
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Figure 3. Impacts on STS-86 radiator interconnect
lines.
The largest impact, on the external line at panel #1,
penetrated just over halfway through the 0.9 mm wall
thick coolant tube wall [6]. Post flight inspections
determined that the site experienced detached spall
on the inside surface of the tube wall, close to a tube
perforation (Fig. 3). A tube leak would likely have
resulted in a mission abort and possible loss of
mission objectives. Post flight analysis indicated that
impact #1 was caused by an orbital debris particle of
stainless steel, while impact #2 was produced by a
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Figure 4. MMOD impacts on STS-1 18 LH4 radiator.
micrometeoroid particle. After this mission, an
additional layer of beta cloth was added to the
external radiator lines on all orbiters [6].
The STS-118 mission in 2007 experienced a large
MMOD impact on the left hand #4 radiator. The
impact produced a 5.5 mm diameter entry hole in the
thermal tape and outer face sheet of the aluminum
sandwich panel (Fig. 4). Subsequent inspections
revealed a 12 mm x 19 mm exit hole in the inner face
sheet of the radiator panel, with two small down
stream damage sites on a thermal control system
(TCS) blanket under the radiator. The payload bay
door under the TCS blanket was not damaged by the
impact. Analysis showed that this impact was caused
by an orbital debris particle that was rich in Titanium,
Zinc and Antimony.
The reduction in allowable damage increased
calculated MMOD risks for future missions [9]. The
knowledge of a specific regional vulnerability
allowed a strategic response to the risk, which is
described in the following sections.
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COLUMBIA ACCIDENT AND AFTERMATH
On February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia
was destroyed on reentry due to a failure of the TPS.
A piece of foam debris punctured an RCC panel on
the left wing leading edge and allowed hot plasma
from the reentry to enter the wing and break the
shuttle apart from within [7].
The Space Shuttle program has made several
operational changes since the disaster in an attempt to
lower the risk of damage that would cause a loss of
the vehicle on reentry.
RCC FAILURE CRITERIA UPDATES
As part of the Shuttle Return-to-Flight effort, the
NASA/JSC Hypervelocity Impact Technology
Facility performed hypervelocity impact testing and
analysis of Shuttle WLE RCC test samples to update
threshold failure criteria [8]. After the hypervelocity
impact (HVI) tests, the samples were exposed to
typical reentry heating conditions at the NASA/JSC
Arc-Jet (AJ) Facility to determine the extent of
heating induced damage growth. It was found from
the HVI/AJ testing that non-penetrating pits would
lead to burn-through in some areas of the WLE where
burn-through can lead to loss-of-vehicle (LOV)
during reentry. Results of the AJ testing on RCC
indicated that the WLE failure criteria for LOV
should be reduced for MMOD assessments on future
missions. Figures 5 and 6 show the WLE and nose
cap failure criteria maps before and after the changes.
Figure 5. Pre-STS-107 RCC failure criteria map.
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Figure 6. Post-STS-107 RCC failure criteria map.
ORBITER/ISS MATED ATTITUDES
The Shuttle and ISS Programs were able to mitigate a
significant portion of the increased MMOD impact
risk to the orbiter by changing the orientation of the
ISS while the shuttle is docked. The change in
orientation – essentially flying the ISS “backwards” –
provided incidental shielding to the shuttle as well as
directing MMOD sensitive areas of the WLE and
nose cap away from the majority of the MMOD
particle flux. Figure 7 shows the shuttle-ISS docked
attitude before the orientation change, with the belly
of the vehicle oriented into the velocity direction of
ISS motion and highest MMOD impact flux. The
attitude change illustrated in figure 8 orients the
bottom of the shuttle in the wake direction of ISS
reducing MMOD impacts to the most vulnerable
surfaces of the vehicle and improving crew safety
and odds of mission success.
Analysis has shown the ISS -XVV docking attitude
results in a 3X reduction in overall MMOD mission
risk for the orbiter when compared to a mission with
equivalent ISS +XVV exposure hours. The revised
docking attitude increases the MMOD risk to the
upper wing and fuselage TPS, but these areas have a
higher damage tolerance for reentry. The new
docking attitude produces a higher risk of
replacement for crew module windows, which is a
cost and schedule issue for the shuttle program. The
risk of a payload bay door radiator tube leak is also
higher with the new docking attitude. The program
impact of a radiator tube leak failure is a potential
early mission abort.
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Figure 7. ISS +XVV mated attitude, higher MMOD
impact risk to lower TPS
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Figure 8. ISS –XVV mated attitude, lower MMOD
impact risk to lower TPS, residual risk concentrated on
nose cap
ON-ORBIT INSPECTION
Since the STS-114 mission in 2005, in which
Discovery made the first flight following the
Columbia accident, NASA has implemented several
new procedures to verify TPS integrity. Prior to
docking with the ISS, Discovery performed a
Rendezvous Pitch Maneuver, simply a 360° pitch
rotation, allowing high resolution imagery of re-entry
critical areas of the vehicle to be acquired by
astronauts aboard the ISS.
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Figure 9. Orbiter Boom Sensor System.
The STS-114 mission also included the 15.2 m long
Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS), shown Figure
9. The OBSS, an extension to the Remote
Manipulator System (RMS), was used to inspect the
orbiter for damage. The Integrated Sensor Inspection
System (ISIS) at the end of the OBSS is shown in
figure 10. The ISIS consists of two sensor packages.
Sensor Package 1 (SP1) includes the Laser Dynamic
Range Imager (LDRI) and Intensified Television
Camera (ITVC), both mounted on a Pan and Tilt Unit
(PTU). The LDRI was primarily used to provide
imagery of the wing leading edge and nose cap RCC
surfaces. The ITVC was primarily used to collect
additional imagery (focused inspections) of RCC
areas of interest as identified by a screening team.
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Figure 10. OBSS sensor suite
Sensor Package 2 (SP2), for STS-114, consisted of
the Laser Camera System (LCS). The LCS was
primarily used for detailed 3D measurements of
damaged tile regions. After STS-114, SP2 also
includes an ISIS Digital Camera (IDC). The IDC is a
higher resolution 2-dimensional digital camera. It is
used to collect additional imagery (focused
inspections) of RCC areas of interest as identified by
screening and damage assessment teams.
The next return to flight mission, STS-121 in 2006,
introduced a late inspection procedure. The goal of
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Figure 12. Plug repair concept.
late inspection is to inspect the Orbiter, as late in the
mission as possible, for MMOD damage to RCC
surfaces. Typically, the LDRI sensor is used to
inspect the RCC surfaces in the same manner as the
flight day 2 early inspections. Imagery returned by
the sensors is examined for distinct features
consistent with MMOD damage. The sensor system
can be used to discern impact features as small as 2
mm (0.080 inches).
Analysis has shown that late inspection can mitigate
as much as 50% of the critical MMOD risk on a
typical shuttle mission. It’s possible that
improvements in the system discernment level and
inspection efficiency could lead to further reductions
in MMOD risk.
Figure 11. WLEIDS overview
ON-ORBIT DETECTION
The WLEIDS consists of 132 single axis
accelerometers mounted along the length of the
orbiter’s leading edge wing spars (Fig. 11). During
launch, the accelerometers collect data at a rate of 20
kHz and store that data onboard for subsequent
downlink to Mission Control [10]. Within 6 to 8
hours of launch, summary files containing periodic
sub-samples of the data collected by each
accelerometer are down linked for analysis to find
potential signatures of ascent damage. This analysis
must be completed within 24 to 48 hours of the
launch so the results can be used to schedule focused
inspection using the OBSS sensor. The WLEIDS has
some limited capability to detect MMOD impacts to
the WLE, and this data may also be used to guide and
influence inspection decisions.
ON ORBIT REPAIR
The Shuttle program has manifested two options for
on orbit RCC repair. The repair must prevent plasma
flow through the damaged RCC. One option is a pre-
ceramic polymer designed to repair small cracks and
coating losses on the exterior of the RCC panel. The
crack repair option uses a pre-ceramic polymer
sealant impregnated with carbon-silicon carbide
powder, together known as NOAX (Non-Oxide
Adhesive eXperimental). It is designed to be applied
by an astronaut using a space-adapted caulking gun
and putty knife.
The second repair option is designed for the repair of
13 to 100 mm diameter holes in RCC panels. The
plug repair consists of a carbon silicon carbide (C-
SiC) patch coated with sealant and mechanically
attached to the remaining RCC structure with a T-bar
attachment mechanism made of TZM (a
molybdenum alloy). The plug is a 178 mm diameter,
0.762 mm thick cover plate that are designed to flex
up to 6 mm to conform to the shape of the wing
leading edge RCC panels, and a hardware attachment
mechanism similar to a toggle bolt. If the damage site
is less than 25 mm, astronauts would use a special bit
to drill out the hole.
SAFE HAVEN
As a last resort, Contingency Shuttle Crew Support
(CSCS), also known as safe haven, would be used to
return the crew of a critically damaged Shuttle. If
repair operations were determined to be unsuccessful,
CSCS could be used to rescue the crew. The CSCS
scenario allows the visiting crew of a critically
damaged Shuttle to live onboard the Space Station
until a rescue Shuttle can be launched. The viability
of this option is tied to resource limitation on the ISS
and the time required to prepare a rescue vehicle for
launch.
SUMMARY
A number of recent shuttle MMOD threat mitigation
techniques were presented. Inspection methods
include photographic examinations of the thermal
protection system with the Rendezvous Pitch
Maneuver and the Orbiter Boom Sensor System.
Recognition of MMOD impacts with the Wing
Leading Edge Impact Detection System was
described. Two Wing Leading Edge RCC repair
methods were discussed: NOAX repairs, for coating
damage and Plug repairs for holes. Operational
changes for the flight program include a revised
mated attitude when the shuttle is docked to the 	 5
International Space Station. The Contingency Shuttle
Crew Support (Safe Haven) option and Launch on
Need (LON) rescue vehicle were presented as a last
resort to save the crew of a damaged shuttle. 	 6
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